“We’re doing here what others can’t do at home for fear of economic loss. In a paradoxical twist, the war in Ukraine is actually leading to a partial improvement in Europe’s environment,” writes Oleksii Vasyliuk, a conservationist and zoologist by training. Vasyliuk heads the NGO Ukrainian Nature Conservation Group, works at Kholodnyi Yar National Nature Park and the Askania-Nova Biosphere Reserve, and co-founded the Ukraine War Environmental Consequences Work Group, an international online journal focused on the war’s environmental impact in Ukraine.
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25 Strategic Questions
for Ukraine
A special project from the Frontier Institute and Ukraïner, where Ukrainian intellectuals and artists seek not only to identify challenges for Ukraine, but to create deep discussions around them, allowing for new contours of social development.
Project curator — Kateryna Botanova, Head of Media Projects at the Frontier Institute.
Why Environmental Issues Can’t Be Left at the Bottom of the Agenda—and How Challenges Can Become Opportunities. Read the full essay to learn more.
A New Way to Look at War
The full-scale war in Ukraine has fundamentally changed how we think about war. Rapid advances in technology and unprecedented documentation mean that many key moments—from horrific war crimes to remarkable acts of heroism—are now captured in photos and videos and often shared in real time.
Undoubtedly, this war is the first to be thoroughly analyzed worldwide through the lens of its environmental consequences.
For this purpose, new analytical methods are being developed, and special governmental and intergovernmental groups are being created. New civil society organizations are also emerging, established exclusively to study the environmental consequences of the war in Ukraine, such as the international expert group UWEC (Ukraine War Environmental Consequences Work Group).
Illustration: Anna Domanska
In the twentieth century, world wars and other large-scale military conflicts were generally not viewed through an environmental lens, as ecology as a science is relatively young. Although dedicated conservationists have been working for a long time, their voices were not always heard globally. The situation changed with the first photographs of Earth from space, taken in 1968, which made the planet appear truly small and fragile. After that, Earth Day was introduced on April 22, 1970. Since then, international environmental legislation and treaties for nature protection have begun to take shape, along with efforts to limit its exploitation. Active public movements emerged against deforestation, ocean pollution, the use of plastics and pesticides, whaling, and many other forms of destruction of life on Earth. During the final decade of the twentieth century, the world talked most about the ozone hole, the onset of global climate change, and also about Chornobyl.
Recommended reading
Learn what the Chonobyl Exclusion Zone was like before the full-scale invasion in our materials from previous expeditions.On November 6, 2021, the UN established the International Day for Preventing the Exploitation of the Environment in War and Armed Conflict. We now live in the era of the first major war examined through an environmental lens. This is also influenced by the tactics of the Russian military, and it is hard not to see their intention to make Ukraine’s territory uninhabitable.
We Depend on Nature
Even if we don’t always realize it, each of us is deeply dependent on nature. We tend to think we live in comfortable homes, buy food at the supermarket, and are generally separate from the environment. But in reality, nature provides all our basic needs.
The air we breathe has a composition suitable for us thanks to photosynthesis. Around 60% of all food fit for human consumption comes from plants pollinated by wild insects and animals raised on plant-based feed. Another roughly 30% comes from seafood, which is not farmed but harvested directly from natural ocean ecosystems. Agriculture mainly relies on soils formed by natural ecosystems. A significant portion of our energy resources—from firewood to fossil fuels—also originates from ecosystems. The planet’s climate is shaped by evaporation from forests and the concentration of carbon in the atmosphere.
In other words, our existence directly depends on nature functioning normally. And when it is destroyed, territories become less suitable or even completely uninhabitable. This is not only about environmental pollution, but also about losing the very ecosystems that provide the basic conditions for life.
It is no coincidence that apocalyptic scenarios in literature and film are almost always associated with environmental catastrophes, like droughts, extreme weather events, and desertification. The American evolutionary biologist and physiologist Jared Diamond argues that, throughout human history, the collapse of civilizations has always been due to environmental causes.
In this context, Russia’s war against Ukraine has all the hallmarks of an ecological war. In areas where active fighting is taking place, this is essentially what we call ecocide—not accidental harm, but a deliberate strategy of environmental destruction. From the very first days of the full-scale invasion, the Russian army has targeted oil depots, warehouses of agrochemicals and building materials, ammonia storage facilities, and city wastewater treatment plants. Most of these sites have no direct military significance, but their destruction causes large-scale, long-term environmental pollution and forces people to leave their homes.
Illustration: Anna Domanska
Such actions directly violate international humanitarian law: the Geneva Conventions prohibit waging war in ways that cause long-term environmental harm. This prohibition follows logic similar to the ban on weapons of mass destruction. Whether nuclear, chemical, or biological, these weapons are restricted not because of how “terrible” they look, but because they do not distinguish between military and civilian targets and have long-lasting effects. While the primary impact of conventional munitions is mostly short-term, the use of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons leaves areas dangerous for years or even decades. Environmental destruction works the same way.
For example, one need only recall the so-called “red zones” in France and other European countries after World War I. More than a hundred years have passed, but parts of these territories remain dangerous and restricted for visitation because of contamination from military actions.
Russia’s war against Ukraine has been fought for years on the same territories. While the front line has stayed relatively stable, this very fact means these lands are subjected to constant, accumulating damage—explosions, fires, pollution, and more.
It’s clear that the scale of this destruction already surpasses anything Europe experienced in the twentieth century. The consequences are simple and severe: some parts of Ukraine may become uninhabitable—not just because of landmines, but also because of environmental damage.
Ecocide
The consequences of the full-scale war for Ukraine’s environment are truly staggering. What has happened and continues to happen in the combat zone largely deserves the definition of “ecocide.”
It is important to note that the term “ecocide” was first legally established in Ukraine when the current version of the Criminal Code was adopted in 2001. In the context of the war that Russia launched on our territory, it has gained wide international recognition. Since then, this word has ceased to be just a metaphor or a journalistic device used by environmental activists and has become a fully fledged legal term, denoting the large-scale destruction of the natural environment and all living things in a given area.
During the full-scale war, this concept has been used especially often—particularly in reference to the destruction of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant, strikes on chemical plants, and the transformation of large areas into, essentially, scorched earth.
The clearest example of ecocide is the destruction of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Dam, which happened at the peak of the breeding season for many mammals, birds, fish, and other species. Most had already produced offspring, but those young had little chance of surviving. The flood swept all living creatures from the reservoir into the sea, where they died in the salt water. At the same time, organisms living on the reservoir floor perished as it rapidly dried out. In the lower reaches of the Dnipro, including the delta, a significant portion of terrestrial and aquatic organisms was washed away and carried out to sea. There is a well-founded risk that some species, historically known only from this area, may have been lost entirely. In addition, the northwestern part of the Black Sea—one of the most productive zones where marine life gathers during the breeding season—was filled for a long period with polluted fresh water. This also led to mass mortality of organisms within the marine ecosystems themselves.
Additional Reading
Writer and Ukrainian servicemember Yevhen Lyr takes readers to the steppes of the Kherson region in his book The Flood. Drawing on personal accounts, he recounts what it is like to live through an occupation and the destruction of the Kakhovka Dam. The book is available for purchase in the Ukraїner store.At the same time, it is important not to devalue the term “ecocide.” Not every incident qualifies. Ecocide is the systematic, large-scale destruction of all living things in a given area. It is important to understand how to assess this.
State authorities in Ukraine regularly announce estimates of the environmental damage caused by Russia, and these figures keep rising. According to the latest data provided at the beginning of 2026, the total has already reached about $6.4 trillion, a significant portion of which is damage to protected natural areas. For someone unfamiliar with the subject, this figure seems colossal. However, in reality, it’s just the tip of the iceberg.
The problem is that Ukrainian legislation allows environmental damage to be assessed only on the basis of reports from environmental inspectors. In other words, assessment is possible only in places where an inspector can physically arrive, take measurements, record the damage, and draw up the appropriate protocol at the time of inspection.
Obviously, this is impossible in areas of active hostilities. Moreover, a significant part of the affected territories was, or still remains, under occupation. In addition, air and river water pollution—both constantly moving—and soil contamination, where concentrations change after rainfall, are all variable indicators. All of this blurs the possibility of accurate accounting. Even where inspectors can work, they document only a small fraction of the real losses. The true scale is hard to even imagine. And the issue is not just the scale, but also the fact that no damage assessment system is designed for such catastrophic impacts.
Life After
So, what will Ukraine be like, environmentally, after the war ends? This is a complex and ambiguous question. A significant part of the territory—especially those that were occupied or in active combat zones—will remain mined for a long time. According to international estimates, even if the war ended today, it could take several centuries to fully clear Ukraine of mines—some say it could take over 700 years. In other words, people alive today will never see a fully demined Ukraine.
It is clear that the demining process will be carried out with strict prioritization. Systematic planning is already underway: first, populated areas, roads, and agricultural lands will be cleared—territories with immediate value for restoring life and the economy. Conversely, natural areas and heavily damaged industrial zones will probably be the last to be cleared. Over time, explosives won’t stay on the surface—they’ll sink deep into the soil there, beneath vegetation and tree roots, making them even harder to find decades or even centuries from now.
Illustration: Anna Domanska
A very important conclusion follows from this: some areas of Ukraine will remain, for a long time—or perhaps forever—zones unsuitable for safe human use. Nature will reclaim these areas.
Nature will not wait for our decisions—it is already recovering in places where people have left. However, this recovery is not always unambiguously positive in the classical sense. In some cases, such as at the site of the former Kakhovka Reservoir, natural ecosystems are truly being restored, including floodplain forests that existed there before the reservoir was created. Conversely, in combat zones, we often see a very different process: these areas become overgrown with invasive, non-native species like tree of heaven (ailanthus), black locust (acacia), wild olive (elaeagnus angustifolia), goldenrod, and Canadian fleabane. This is not a full restoration of wild nature, but rather a spontaneous, uncontrolled transformation of ecosystems.
At the same time, this is the largest process of spontaneous land restoration in Europe, and it creates a complicated situation. On the one hand, the state and people will want to reclaim these areas for their own use, as millions have lost their homes and will want to return. On the other hand, a significant portion of these territories will be either dangerous due to mines or unfit for life because of their ecological condition. In many cases, the state will be forced to acknowledge that demining them is not worthwhile.
We already have a precedent: the Chornobyl Exclusion Zone. Some self-settlers live there at their own risk, but overall, the area is considered unfit for human habitation. At the same time, for wildlife, the absence of people has been the main driver of recovery. For instance, in 2016, the exclusion zone was designated a biosphere reserve. It is quite possible that some of the lands affected by the war will receive a similar status: first as exclusion zones, and later as conservation areas.
Additional Reading
Learn how Russia’s full-scale invasion has created ecological problems in the Chonobyl Exclusion Zone in our article written in cooperation with Kunsht: (Un)safe shelter: the fallout of Russia’s 2025 attack on the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant.This creates a very complex conflict. On the one hand, there are ecological dividends: large expanses covered with vegetation positively affect the climate, water balance, and air quality. For example, the scale of vegetation recovery at the site of the former Kakhovka Reservoir is already unprecedented for Europe. This is beneficial for people as a whole and could, in principle, help meet many pan-European goals in nature conservation and climate change mitigation. On the other hand, after the war, Ukraine’s interest in restoring the economic productivity of its lands will conflict with the European goals of nature conservation, for which it would be most convenient to leave as much territory as possible for natural regeneration. Where the line will be drawn between economic and environmental interests remains to be seen1The European Nature Restoration Law (2024) and the European goals of nature conservation, which EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030 envision European goals of nature conservation, which is the restoration of at least 20% of the EU’s land and sea areas by 2030—that is, one fifth of Europe’s managed territories should return to a natural state. A specific goal within this is the restoration of at least 25,000 kilometers of rivers by removing barriers and returning them to free-flowing conditions by 2030.
Illustration: Anna Domanska
It is very important not to romanticize this situation: this is not a story about “nature being better than people.” Rather, it is about the fact that, as a result of the war, some areas may become uninhabitable, and nature will—by necessity—begin to reclaim them.
A New Map
This is the moment when we have to imagine a new ecological map of Ukraine, one that is not shaped by strategic vision, brilliant planning, or borrowed experience from other countries, but rather one that emerges from the environmental constraints imposed by war. And this map will be fundamentally different. It is not about state borders, but about where life and economic activity will be possible—and what form they will take.
It is clear that Donetsk and Luhansk regions will not return to their roles as industrial centers, since most enterprises are destroyed, mines are flooded, and infrastructure is ruined. Southern Ukraine will also change radically. Without irrigation—previously ensured, in part, by the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant—classic intensive crop farming will be impossible or economically unjustifiable. But this does not mean that these territories will lose their economic potential.
Illustration: Anna Domanska
On the contrary, other land-use models may develop there—for example, livestock farming on natural pastures or cultivating drought-resistant crops. In the current climate, this could even prove more profitable than the old model, where Ukraine exports cheap grain while importing expensive animal products.
Large areas previously used for agriculture may, for a long time or even permanently, shift into spontaneous natural regeneration. Other areas may also be managed differently: large solar or wind power plants may be installed, bioenergy projects implemented, or other forms of low-intensity or renewable land use adopted.
In other words, this new map reflects a completely different economy and a new way of interacting with the land.
At this point, another important factor arises: if Ukraine wants to be a full-fledged player in Europe and the world, to receive international support, and to position itself as an equal partner, it must rethink these changes geopolitically. Yes, they are tragic, but they also represent a new objective reality that cannot be undone. And some of these changes could actually work to Ukraine’s advantage.
Illustration: Anna Domanska
In fact, Ukraine has already accomplished what other countries only declare in their strategies: it has radically reduced industrial emissions, significantly increased the areas where natural vegetation is recovering, reclaimed hundreds of kilometers of riverbeds freed from reservoirs (even the Dnipro itself!), where natural processes are being restored (including fish migration), and millions of hectares are no longer treated with pesticides.
No other European country can currently demonstrate change on this scale. Yet these are precisely the goals set out in European policies, such as the EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030. However, no one wants to make such large-scale economic sacrifices to achieve them.
Ukraine has undergone these changes out of necessity because of the war, creating a unique—though very difficult—situation. We can remain victims of these changes. Or we can rethink them and use them as the basis for a new role for Ukraine in Europe. Moreover, this leads to a simple, though uncomfortable, conclusion for Europe: it owes us a great deal. We’re doing here what others can’t do at home for fear of economic loss. In a paradoxical twist, the war in Ukraine is actually leading to a partial improvement in Europe’s environment.
So now Ukraine has a chance to form a new model of ecological and economic development—a model not based on dependence on irrigation, large reservoirs, or the industrial gigantism inherited from the Soviet past. A model that accounts for environmental limitations and works with natural processes, rather than against them. If we learn from this situation wisely—no matter how difficult or painful its origin—and build a new map of Ukraine according to ecological realities, it could become the foundation for a long-term, safe, and sustainable future.