“I’m inspired by Ukrainian courage”: an interview with Ben Hodges

In this interview, Hodges shares his assessment of the US National Security Strategy, outlines his view of the prospects for a negotiated settlement, and reflects on Europe’s role, capabilities, and what to expect from the transatlantic security landscape in 2026. This conversation is part of our How Come series, in which we speak with people from different countries about the issues that shape our world.

What’s next for Venezuela?

Toppling Maduro was done well by the military and the intelligence community — I have no doubt about that. But that’s the easy part. Now the hard part is: what do you do next? Why did we do it? What’s the end state?

Based on everything I’ve heard and thought about, it’s not clear to me that they’ve planned this through — what they’re actually going to do. It sounds like they’re trying to use leverage over what’s left of the regime and pressure them into doing what the administration wants. But it feels like this could become a real problem for us for a long time, a quagmire.

And this is about oil. This has nothing to do with drugs. I think they’re probably looking at Cuba next. Cuba depends on Venezuelan oil, and Cuba also has thousands of its own people in Venezuela, providing most of the security for Maduro. Several Cubans were killed in the operation to capture him.

It’s hard to say who’s really in charge in Venezuela now. You’ve got the military, the police, drug gangs, and the Cubans. Who’s loyal to who? I don’t know yet.

US National Security Strategy

The National Security Strategy seems to imply that the US wants to be the dominant force in the Western Hemisphere, almost like an old 18th-century idea of spheres of influence. It suggests that Europe is basically on its own. In fact, the strategy even describes Western democracies in Europe as the biggest threat. It barely mentions Russia at all, certainly not as a threat.

Unfortunately, the American president has taken Russia’s side on almost everything over the past year. You don’t really get a sense that he understands how important Europe is to American prosperity and security, except in a purely transactional way.

With China, you get the feeling the president has told Xi, “That’s your sphere, as long as you don’t interfere with our trade, our commerce, and our access to critical minerals.” And that tells me this administration would not go to war over Taiwan, for example.

I think people are starting to wake up to this. There’s been disbelief that the United States — after all these decades of what we’ve done, never perfect, but generally representing liberal democratic values and caring about Europe’s security — has an administration and people supporting it, who come from a completely different philosophy.

Obviously, President Zelenskyy is not confused. But leaders in Germany, Poland, France, the UK, the Netherlands, Denmark — other long-established European countries — are thinking, “Holy hell, this is different.” They absolutely have to acknowledge that they’re going to have to deal with Russia as a threat without assuming strong American participation or presence.

To be candid, they should be able to do it. If you add together the populations, the wealth, the technology, the military, and the industry of all EU countries — plus the UK, Canada, Norway, and Ukraine — it completely dwarfs Russia. There’s no way Russia should be able to threaten them. But it would require countries really working together, and understanding that Russia is already at war with them — even if it’s not launching Kinzhal missiles at other European cities.

Russia as a threat to Europe

I think, first, Europeans are still in disbelief. They can’t believe that in 2025, 2026 you have this massive war in Europe, and that it presents a real threat to people living in Italy, Spain, Greece, France, Denmark. They can’t believe it.

Politicians — political leaders — are slow to make the case, to explain what the threat is, and why, to prevent that war. You have to show that you’re prepared for it.

The Russians, of course, for years have been building their own influence in these countries — through money, through corruption, through dependence on Russia for energy. It’s taking time to get disconnected from that Russian influence.

There are many right-wing parties in European countries that are either pro-Russia, anti-Ukraine, or isolationist. In fact, the Trump administration has reached out to them, like AfD, for example, in Germany. But it’s not only there: it’s in the UK, in France, in Italy, where you’ve got real internal debates about the EU, NATO, Russia.

All of these things contribute to a lack of urgency among European leaders. I think it’s going to take a few — you’re not going to get everybody — but a few who are not confused to do what’s necessary, and then perhaps others will come along. That’s the way it’s always been in history.

Is there accountability for partnering with Russia in the past?

Everybody had their hands in this. Governments in most European countries believed, somehow, that Russia could be a partner and that we didn’t need to have a strong military.

Angela Merkel wrote a book where she makes no apologies. She’s not going to suddenly say, “Oh, you know, I was wrong.” Also, she was not the first. There were people before her, and around her, who also supported this, who believed in this policy of working with Russia through trade as a way to bring about normalised relations.

Certainly, Germany depended on cheap Russian energy all the way up until late 2021. But they’re not alone. You have huge amounts of Russian money in London — that’s why they called it “London Oblast.” You’ve got Switzerland, Austria, big Russian money all over Italy and France.

I don’t know if there’s much value in chasing all that down now. What’s more important is for European leaders to put their energy into helping their populations recognise the threat: that Russia is at war with us, and that this is not just about Ukraine. It’s about Russia continuing its efforts to regain territories it believes it should not have lost with the breakup of the Soviet Union.

Ukraine-US relations under Trump administration

President Zelenskyy is obviously in a very difficult position. I think he understands that the US is not going to be the same as under the Biden administration. But he certainly wouldn’t want the US to stop all aid or to stop other countries from providing American-made equipment, for example.

In my personal opinion, he’s acting in good faith in a negotiating process to keep the Trump administration involved. There are also some European countries that would run if they thought the Ukrainian side wasn’t seriously looking for a negotiated outcome. This shows good faith to them as well.

I believe Zelenskyy, and most Ukrainians, are not fooled or confused by who the Russians are or what they’re doing. They’re not deceived into thinking Russia would suddenly live up to an agreement if it wasn’t forced on them. President Zelenskyy needs to manage all of these things at a time of enormous pressure.

Does Russia want a peace deal with Ukraine?

Russia has zero interest in engaging in a just, sustainable, negotiated settlement that would be acceptable to Ukraine or to other European countries. They have never backed off their maximalist demands, and I don’t think anybody should be confused that they really just want peace — because that’s obviously not the case.

Putin will keep this going as long as he thinks he can win — and by “win,” I mean that the rest of us will quit: that Europe will quit or that even Ukrainians will quit. He doesn’t care about casualties, and he doesn’t care whether people are happy with their own economy, as long as he can keep paying for the war.

That stops when he’s no longer able to export oil and gas to China, India, and other customers to finance this. Which is why I think what Ukraine is doing now — going after Russia’s oil and gas infrastructure — is exactly the right approach: to prevent them from being able to export energy to their buyers.

It’s also clear to me that Russia cannot overwhelm Ukrainian defenders. In 2025, Russia gained about 0.8–1 % of Ukrainian territory, at the cost of roughly 400,000 casualties. I don’t see that changing in the coming year. This year is likely to bring the same awful attrition, but Ukrainians seem to have made the right adjustments.

The hard part, of course, is that it’s very difficult for Ukraine’s defenses to fully protect cities and civilians from these constant attacks. I expect that will continue.

For me, there are three key things.

First, Russian air attacks will continue against civilian targets. It’s horrific, but it’s not decisive. Russia cannot win the war like that.

Second, on the ground, Ukraine has stopped Russia. I think Ukraine probably feels confident that even though the fighting is terrible — and Ukrainian casualties are real — after twelve years Russia still only controls about 20 % of Ukraine, and it’s not going to get significantly better for them.

And third, Ukraine’s attacks on Russia’s oil and gas exports — refineries, terminals, shadow fleet vessels, all of it. That’s the path, in my view. That’s the theory of victory.

Sanctions as a key to stopping Russia

Enforcement of sanctions is the key. It’s not that we need more sanctions. We need to enforce the law we already have.

There are too many routes where even American companies — though not only American — have components that still find their way into Russian weapons, for example through India. There are European countries as well where companies are violating sanctions.

We learned just a few months ago that a Danish company was doing maintenance on shadow fleet vessels, and a Lithuanian company was refuelling them. I mean, how can that be happening?

European countries around the Baltic Sea have to work together and use international law to prevent Russia from simply sailing shadow fleet vessels in and out of the Baltic. This requires political will. It’s hard. It’s not easy to do. But if we’re serious about this, these are exactly the kinds of steps we have to take.

If you choke Russia’s ability to export oil and gas, that’s how you suffocate them — you cut off the resources they need to keep this war going.

Predictions for 2026

I’m inspired by Ukrainian courage and tenacity, and I think Russia is in trouble. I don’t see Russia having the ability to do anything more than what it’s doing right now.

If Ukraine can continue to reduce its own casualties and improve its manpower situation, I think a year from now the situation on the ground will look pretty much like it does today.

But hopefully, we’ll also see a dramatic reduction in Russia’s ability to keep attacking Ukrainian civilians.

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